When we think of Russia, we tend to think of the great “Russian Steamroller” of the Russian Empire or Soviet Union, with their enormous (by European standards of the time) populations and huge potential to throw large numbers of troops into battle.
But, and I know I say this a lot:
Russia is not the Soviet Union.
The Russian invasion of Ukraine is not the kind of conflict the Russian army has prepared for. The army is being asked to fight at essentially peacetime strength, leaving behind its conscripts and not calling up the larger class of its reserves.
That has left the Russian army short staffed and, critically, lacking infantry to support the number of tanks and armoured vehicles it has deployed. How that has influenced the fighting is uncertain, but it does seem to have contributed to the loss of unsupported armour, and a real difficulty in taking urban and fortified areas. In their place, Russia has inserted national guard troops, mercenaries, and huge numbers of proxy-forces from the DPR and LPR.
In this video we look at the importance of infantry, even on a battlefield dominated by advanced vehicles and systems, examine the roots of the Russian deficit, and also have a look at how Russia is trying to get around this issue.
In doing so, we’re also going to tackle a number of myths and questions regarding Russian manpower in Ukraine. Ever wondered how Russia can apparently outnumber Ukraine in the Donbass despite Ukraine mobilising reservists or why people claim there are tends or hundreds of thousands of conscripts with WW2 equipment fighting for Russia?
We’re going to talk about the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics, and try to answer some of those questions.
I will not be covering Ukrainian mobilisation this episode, if only because it has its own, almost diametrically opposite strengths and weaknesses and a totally different force design behind it.
My thanks to the many sources covering this topic – particularly the venerable Michael Kofman whose work on Russian force structures was critical to this piece.
Interesting reading:
NOT BUILT FOR PURPOSE: THE RUSSIAN MILITARY’S ILL-FATED FORCE DESIGN – MICHAEL KOFMAN AND ROB LEE
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TIMESTAMPS
00:00:00 — The image of military power
00:01:48 — There are questions to be asked
00:02:59 — The contention: The Russian Army has too much metal and not enough grunts
00:03:29 — What am I covering?
00:04:32 — The jobs only infantry can do
00:08:30 — The jobs only infantry can do: Armies do know it, including the Russian Army
00:10:51 — Where are the Russian infantry?
00:13:24 — Where are the Russian infantry? Issue 1: the Russian Army is too small
00:16:03 — Where are the Russian infantry? Issue 2: Mobilisation
00:17:11 — Where are the Russian infantry? Issue 3: Undermanning
00:18:27 — Where are the Russian infantry? Issue 4: Over-Armouring
00:20:02 — Where are the Russian infantry? Issue 5: Organisation (Private Conscriptovic returns)
00:22:40 — Where are the Russian infantry? Issue 6: Early losses
00:24:46 — Where are the Russian infantry? Recap
00:26:52 — Russian Solutions: Shadow Mobilisation
00:28:16 — Russian Solutions: The TikTokers and the Wagner Group
00:29:13 — Russian Solutions: Training unit cannibalization
00:31:28 — Russian Solutions: The Donbass Proxy forces
00:31:43 — The Donbass Proxy Forces: What are the DLPR (DPR/LPR)?
00:33:26 — The Donbass Proxy Forces: Disclaimer on DPR/LPR sources
00:34:59 — The Donbass Proxy Forces: Pre-war forces & subsequent mobilisation
00:36:41 — The Donbass Proxy Forces: Verification & Numbers
00:37:52 — The Donbass Proxy Forces: Training
00:40:04 — The Donbass Proxy Forces: Equipment
00:43:11 — The Donbass Proxy Forces: Are they the Cannon Fodder?
00:46:03 — What Russia needs vs what they have
00:47:07 — The discrepancy between the Russian narrative and and use of DLPR forces
00:47:55 — Why does this matter
00:49:58 — Sustainability
00:51:33 — Channel Update
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